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How do we decode the puzzling trends in women’s labour force participation in India given the substantial decline between 2004-5 and 2017-18 and a striking increase thereafter? Does a focus on overall work participation take our attention away from underlying stagnation in women’s wage work?

Sonalde Desai and Ashwini Deshpande discussed data and trends in women’s work at a seminar at O P Jindal Global University and argued that much of the swing in women’s work is caused by trends in women’s work on family farms. Participation in wage labour – either as casual labour or as salaried work – has remained stagnant and deserves urgent attention.

Carbon pricing has emerged as a key policy instrument for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, with carbon taxes and emissions trading as the main tools. As of June 2024, 89 national and subnational jurisdictions globally have implemented carbon pricing, covering 24% of global GHG emissions. Asian countries in particular are increasingly using emissions trading systems (ETSs) to meet their climate goals. This paper provides a comprehensive review of all national and subnational ETSs in the Asia and Pacific region—namely, in Australia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and New Zealand. We also examine the European Union ETS (EU ETS) as a reference point since it is the oldest ETS for GHGs and the largest by value of trading. Each ETS presents unique characteristics but they share common challenges, such as limited sectoral coverage, weak price signals, and issues related to monitoring and enforcement.

An important contribution of the paper is an assessment framework to evaluate ETSs in the four countries where adequate data is available for such analysis—namely, the PRC, Kazakhstan, the ROK, and New Zealand. The framework comprises eight criteria for evaluating an ETS—contribution to GHG mitigation; cost-effectiveness of mitigation; predictability; robustness; accountability and transparency; administrative cost-effectiveness; fairness; and compatibility with national circumstances and other GHG mitigation policies. These eight criteria are further elaborated into 28 specific indicators against which the paper evaluates the ETSs. Based on this analysis, we recommend policy measures such as clarifying the long-term objectives of ETSs; tightening emissions caps; enhancing administrative capacity for better monitoring, reporting, and verification; and complementary policies to mitigate the distributional impacts of carbon pricing. While ETSs in Asia and the Pacific remain a work in progress, they offer important lessons for countries in the region that are considering or starting to implement emissions trading.

Read More: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/1007506/apcr2024bp-carbon-pricing-emissions-trading-asia-pacific.pdf

Opinion: Sonalde Desai and Debasis Barik.

[The Indian Express, October 25, 2024]

If south India wants a larger population, it needs to focus on family-friendly policies or encourage migration from more populous states.

In 1944, Stalin (Joseph not MK) established the Mother Heroine award for women who had given birth to 10 or more children. In the wake of population decimation during World War II, motherhood was glorified as a service to Russia with honour, stipends, and a promise of early retirement. Nonetheless, Russian fertility followed the rest of Europe, reaching a low Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 1.16 in 1999. The original awards were abolished in 1995, but new rewards for motherhood were established in 2008. Nevertheless, after a temporary rebound, Russian fertility fell to TFR of 1.4.

This story has a lesson for modern-day South Indian leaders, MK Stalin and Chandrababu Naidu. It suggests that appeals to national interests or financial rewards do little to convince families to have more children if they do not see this in their interest.

What does the global fertility transition tell us about very low fertility? Three aspects of the European and East Asian experiences deserve attention. First, European fertility has shown interesting gyrations over the past three decades, dropping to “lowest-low fertility” of 1.3 or lower around 2000 and then rebounding to 1.8 or 1.9 by 2010, before falling again to 1.4-1.6 in 2023. It would be tempting to take a snapshot at any given time and argue that falling fertility is due to declining value of family and increasing fertility is due to the importance of government incentives for more children.

However, demographers like John Bongaarts, Griffith Feeney, and Tomas Sobotka caution us against generalising from TFR. The TFR is a mathematical construct summarising the fertility rates of different generations. When the age at marriage rises, it may lead to an artificial slump in fertility, reducing fertility for women in their 20s but increasing when they marry and have children later, affecting the tempo of fertility, not overall fertility. Europe’s very low fertility circa 2000 experienced a rebound between 2005 and 2015 due to this tempo effect; for example, Russian fertility rose from 1.16 in 1999 to 1.51 in 2008. As education increases and marriage age rises in India, we may also see a temporary decline to very low fertility levels.

The second lesson for us comes from East Asia. Korea, Singapore and even China are experiencing extremely low fertility rates, with Korea having the lowest TFR in the world, 0.8. Here, low fertility is not a function of the lack of importance of children but rather of too much importance given to parenting and the responsibilities of mothers. It leads to immense investments in a single precious child. Research by Alaka Basu and Sonalde Desai has documented that even in India, parents often limit themselves to one child to invest in his or her education. Improving the quality of public education and reducing the time burden on parents to supervise children’s education may reduce pressure on parents to engage in a trade-off between having more children and improving the future opportunities for their children.

In China, the government relaxed the one-child norm, allowing women to have up to three children with little effect on Chinese fertility. Reduction in childcare support by the state during economic liberalisation led to a decline in women’s labour force participation from over 90 per cent to 61 per cent and simultaneously reduced fertility. In contrast, Sweden has been a family-friendly country, and from 2015 to 2020, its fertility rate was 1.9 with some annual fluctuations. Generous maternity and paternity leave, excellent childcare, and social norms encouraging couples to share work and parenting responsibilities have helped make having children more accessible.

Apart from global lessons, we must not forget our own experiences. Naidu has proposed allowing only people with two or more children to contest elections. However, manipulating fertility via election eligibility has been ineffective in the past. In 2001, five states, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Odisha, banned the election of people with large families. IAS Officer Nirmala Buch studied these states and found these restrictions were simply ignored. Why do we think the opposite restriction will have any effect?

Most importantly, in a democratic society, whether to have a child or not to have a child is a fundamental human right. As sociologist Judith Blake famously noted, People do not have birth rates; they have children. If Andhra and Tamil Nadu want larger populations, they have two options. Either emulate Sweden and put family-friendly policies in effect that support families or encourage migration from more populous states of north India to combat population ageing and reduce the impact of potential delimitation.

Desai is professor and centre director, NCAER National Data Innovation Centre and Barik is senior fellow, NCAER. Views are personal.

Opinion: Sonalde Desai.

[The Indian Express, September 30, 2024]

Instead of focussing excessively on rankings with well-recognised shortcomings, recognising achievements and refining goals consistent with national priorities will be a more fruitful approach.

Developing global indices and rankings has turned into a minor industry. The Global Competitiveness Index, Global Happiness Index, Global Hunger Index, Ease of Doing Business Index, Corruption Perception Index, Global Go-To Think Tanks rankings, you name it. Think tanks specialise in creating these indices; they are good for increased funding and publicity. Some governments boast of improved rankings, while others rant about the methodology. Life goes on until the following year when the cycle begins again.

Every time these indices appear, I wonder why some countries are where they are. Apparently, young people in Lithuania and Israel are the happiest in the world. Why are they happier than the youth in Australia, New Zealand, or Sweden? Is Gallup just counting the Jewish population of Israel, or do Arabs count? Unfortunately, these questions rarely get asked and answered.

Sometimes, we get to see strange anomalies. Take, for example, the Global Gender Gap Index. India ranked 26th on educational attainment in 2023 but mysteriously dropped to 112th rank in 2024. As far as I know, no Taliban-style attacks on Indian girls’ education have taken place. This rapid descent remains inexplicable. Could there be some anomalies in the data?

All global rankings are not equivalent. Some, like the Human Development Index, are well thought out and carefully constructed, although they also face challenges in getting accurate country-level data. Others seem to be hastily put together, often excluding perspectives from the Global South. For example, the now-abandoned World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index focused on limited liability companies, covering only 14 per cent of Indian businesses and excluding sole proprietorships, the mainstay of Indian businesses. The Global Gender Gap Index focusses on the gender gap in earnings but not in poverty — an indicator on which the United States might do poorly due to a large number of mother-only families, but where South Asian countries might fare better.

Nonetheless, given how much international organisations and foundations that fund them love ranking countries and are convinced these are effective tools in holding countries accountable, it is unlikely that any criticism will vanquish this industry. However, it is possible to hold it accountable through simple steps.

First, we must expect that any index will contain a methodological appendix that justifies why specific indicators were chosen to be a part of the index and the rationale underlying the differential weights given to these indicators. The publications must include links to source data. The lazy approach of citing the World Bank indicators or the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s indicators is insufficient. Index authors must cite the original sources for each indicator for each country. As it stands, data errors in index construction are impossible to decipher, even when we see absurd results like India’s descent from rank 26 to 112 in educational attainment in the Gender Gap Index in a year. This does involve a considerable amount of work, but hard work is what research is all about, what the public and policymakers deserve. Where primary data is presented, sample sizes, sampling methodology and confidence intervals must be presented.

Second, those who cover the release of various indices must find a way of fact-checking the results. An editorial moratorium of coverage for 48 hours after the release of the index will give time to critically examine the results and consult experts. The rush to be the first to report that India is below war-torn Sudan on the Global Hunger Index without a critical examination does not serve the public. In particular, the rankings that do not provide citations to source data and methodology should not be covered.

Third, governments must stop taking these results seriously. Countries are well aware of their priorities and hopefully try to ensure that appropriate data are available to monitor their progress. However, these efforts have little to do with how a country is ranked globally. Take, for example, the Global Hunger Index (GHI). India’s child mortality fell from 9.1 at the turn of the century to 3.1 in two decades, and stunting, defined as low height-for-age, fell from 51 per cent to 36 per cent. Where India is lagging is in caloric intake and low weight-for-height resulting in it being ranked at 117 on GHI. Data challenges for these two indicators are well recognised.

Caloric intake is estimated from consumption expenditure data, which is a poor approximation at best. Moreover, the underlying figures for undernourishment, calculated by FAO combine the 2011-12 NSS consumption data and a recent Gallup poll of 3,000 people to estimate undernourishment. These models deserve greater scrutiny for external validity. Similarly, the wasting data for India is affected by most of the fifth National Family Health Survey interviews being conducted during the monsoon due to the pandemic-related delays. Greater intestinal infections during the monsoons are associated with weight loss, which biases wasting estimates. Instead of focussing excessively on rankings with well-recognised shortcomings, recognising achievements and refining goals consistent with national priorities will be a more fruitful approach.

Amartya Sen, one of the originators of the Human Development Index, has suggested it may be time to move beyond rankings. If we can’t get away from these rankings, at a minimum, we should set up parameters under which they are accurate and sensibly used.

The writer is Professor and Centre Director, NCAER National Data Innovation Centre and Professor Emerita, University of Maryland. Views are personal

Opinion: Sonalde Desai.

[The Hindutan Times, July 3, 2024]

India’s growing economy is lifting families out of poverty but often onto a precarious perch. A single disaster can push them right back. Policy, obsessed with counting the poor, ignores the question of helping ‘newly poor’

Two decades ago, controversies around the measurement of in National Sample Surveys set off what became known as the Great Indian Poverty Debate. We seem to have come full circle with new controversies about poverty measurement, leading to the Great Indian Poverty Debate 2. But is counting the exact number of individuals whose incomes fall below the poverty line, located around ₹1,900, as important as understanding the nature of poverty decline and its implications for social policy?

Some estimates based on Household Consumption Expenditure Survey (HCES) place poverty under 5%. Newly collected Wave 3 of India Human Development Survey (IHDS) places it at about 8.5%. HCES probably underestimates poverty due to a change in methodology, while IHDS probably overestimates poverty due to its reliance on an older sampling frame that omits newly growing peri-urban areas. However, both suggest that poverty is declining. The multidimensional poverty index released by Niti Aayog also documents improvements in the conditions under which households live.

But due to an obsession with estimating the exact number of individuals in poverty, implications of this change for the provision of social safety nets are ignored.

India’s approach to social protection was developed when most of its population was impoverished. Unequal access to productive resources such as infra, land and education led to endemic poverty among some sections of the society (such as SCs and STs) and some areas (such as poorest districts like Dahod, Gadchiroli, and Dhubri). Hence, the primary focus was on designating the poorest sections of society as BPL and providing them various benefits, including food grains.

As the economy grows, it presents both opportunities and challenges. rural residents find work as skilled masons, and urban slum-dwellers become drivers for delivery services. While this is a step out of abject poverty, it also places them on a precarious perch where a single accident, natural disaster, or epidemic could push them back into poverty.

IHDS, organised by National Council of Applied Economic Research and University of Maryland, followed more than 40,000 households between 2004 and 2024. Its results suggest that poverty decline is closely coupled with increasing vulnerability. Between 2004-05 and 2011-12, of the total 22.4% who were poor, 8.5% were newly poor.

That is, if BPL cards were given based on poverty in 2004-05, they would miss out on nearly 40% of the individuals who were poor in 2012. This proportion grew between 2011-12 and 2022-24, although overall poverty declined. Of the 8.5% poor in 2022-24, 5.3% are newly poor, reflecting a decline in chronic poverty and growth in transient poverty.

Whereas accidents of birth largely shaped the fortunes of Indian citizens in the 20^th century, the 21st century has seen a rising importance of accidents of life. The challenge is that we cannot easily predict this descent into disaster. While the death of a wage earner brings debt and misery to one widow, the other may be able to get a loan from a bank to set up a small shed for raising pigs and support herself, yet another may have a son who is grown up and can help his mother.

Our public discourse must acknowledge and celebrate movement out of poverty, but it must also recognise the precarity of this achievement and work towards building safety nets that protect against unforeseen disasters. This involves developing social policies that provide risk insurance and strengthening institutions that can be mobilised to deliver assistance when needed.

Illness and death pose tremendous risks for vulnerable households. Hence, strengthening public health services and building an efficient health insurance programme are critical. Present programmes such as Ayushman Bharat cover only hospital expenditures, which can easily lead to escalating public expenditures as individuals who can be treated in outpatient clinics resort to hospitalisation because they lack the funds to pay OPD fees.

Dealing with emergencies also requires building sustainable institutions. During the pandemic, PDS ensured that grains could be distributed despite price rises and transportation challenges. This helped avert hunger and starvation while highlighting the exclusion of migrants who did not have proof of residence, giving impetus to setting up the One Nation, One Ration Card programme. Similarly, immediate cash needs during flooding or other disasters can be met through an infusion of funds if we have access to registries that link people’s current residential locations with their bank accounts.

We must move past the futile debate about estimating the exact number of poor individuals and accept that poverty is declining, requiring re-envisioning of our social protection programmes to ensure we don’t fail those who need help the most. 

The writer is Professor at National Council of Applied Economic Research & University of Maryland. Views are personal.